This article focuses attention on the construction of trusts and fiduciary relationships, and the importance of considering separately the construction of the parties’ intentions and the categorisation of those intentions as a matter of law. By reference to recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the article identifies unresolved questions about the construction process, and emphasises the importance of the legal concepts that are deployed when an arrangement is categorised as, for example, a trust, or a fiduciary relationship, or property for the purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.

Two main approaches have been used to manage the relationship between state laws of different countries: harmonisation; and the conflict of laws. The article maps these approaches onto the existing jurisprudence on the relationship between state law and tikanga, while bearing in mind the unique constitutional parameters of this relationship and the status of tikanga as the first law of Aotearoa New Zealand. The article concludes that there are parallels between the application of tikanga “as values” and harmonisation, and between the application of tikanga “as law” and the conflict of laws. It shows that there is a need to grapple with the choice between two functions: the harmonisation of state law to move state law closer to tikanga, and the application of an unadulterated tikanga to preserve material differences between state law and tikanga.

This article argues that the purpose of the requisition clause under the ADLS/REINZ Standard Form Agreement is, today, little comprehended. A purchaser’s ability to requisition the vendor’s title is a remnant of the uncertainties of 19th‐century, pre‐Torrens deeds conveyancing. Given the advent of the Torrens system, the clause needs to be either done away with completely or significantly redrafted. The issue has become unduly complicated due to alterations made to the clause in 1995, enabling a vendor (or purchaser) to avoid the agreement where unauthorised cross lease or unit title alterations are made, even though these are not title issues. The authors indicate what changes are required if a standard requisition clause is to remain.

“In the everyday subject of vendor and purchaser it is especially important that the law should be as simple as possible.” Hunt v Wilson [1978] 2 NZLR 261 (CA) at 273 per Cooke J.