Taxation and Risk-Taking: Solving New Zealand's Foreign Investment Fund Liquidity Problem with a Retrospective Capital Gains Tax
New Zealand is one of the few jurisdictions globally to implement an ex ante wealth tax on capital; that is, the government taxes risky assets before actual returns are known. Parliament introduced this system in 2007 to tax foreign portfolio holdings. The current treatment of illiquid holdings under the system deters certain desirable migrants from becoming New Zealand tax residents. That treatment also distorts the market through a double lock-in effect. I illustrate how the rules result in a windfall for either the government or the taxpayer at the expense of the other party when applied to illiquid offshore equities. Based on theoretical work by Alan Auerbach and Louis Kaplow, I propose a retrospective realisation method to replace the cost method which currently applies to illiquid and hard-to-value securities. Additionally, I critique other tax planning opportunities encouraged by the current rules. Ultimately, I argue that the ex ante tax rate should follow the short-term risk-free rate and the government should disallow taxpayers to elect accrual taxation in years of low or negative economic return.